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the concepts of “love” and “affection” in definitions of 
patriotism and also highlight the ambiguity of the notion 
of “country” that features in them. I will then propose a 
normative concept of patriotism, which I call “political 
patriotism.” My argument will be that, in contrast to 
nationalism and other chauvinistic forms of patriotism, 
political patriotism is an ethically acceptable stance for 
cosmopolitan thinkers.
Love of Country
To speak of patriotism as a love or a special affection for 
one’s country suggests that it is an emotion. Accordingly, 
some writers suggest that it is neither rational nor based 
upon a considered judgement (Keller 2007; MacIntyre 
2002; Oldenquist 1982). We do not survey the countries 
Introduction
As evidenced by the reactions to Martha Nussbaum’s 
famous cosmopolitan essay of 1996, patriotism 
is a contested notion in moral debate (Nussbaum 
1996). Many people think of patriotism as “love of 
one’s country”. Stephen Nathanson elaborates on such 
descriptions by defining it as an attitude that involves:
1. Special affection for one’s own country
2. A sense of personal identification with the 
country
3. Special concern for the well-being of the country
4. Willingness to sacrifice to promote the country’s 
good. (Nathanson 1993, 34-5) 





As evidenced by the reactions to Martha Nussbaum’s famous essay of 1996, patriotism is 
a contested notion in moral debate. This paper explores the suggestion made by Stephen 
Nathanson that patriotism might be understood as “love of one’s country”, and suggests 
that this phrase is misleading. It suggests that patriotism, like love, is not rational, and it 
fails to distinguish two kinds of object for that love: one’s cultural community and one’s 
political community. Accordingly, this phrase can lead to a kind of nationalism which involves 
chauvinism and militarism and that is, therefore, morally objectionable. The problem arises from 
ambiguities in the notion of “country” which is said to be the object of such love. Moreover, “love” 
is not the appropriate term for a relationship whose central psychological function is that of 
establishing an individual’s identity as a citizen. I suggest that the proper mode of attachment 
involved in patriotism is identification with one’s political community, and that the proper 
object of a patriot’s allegiance is the political community thought of without the emotional, 
nationalistic and moralistic connotations that often accompany the concept of community. The 
“political patriotism” that arises from such an attitude is sceptical of “the national interest” and 
does not accept that our moral responsibilities to others stop at national borders. In this way 
political patriotism is consistent with a cosmopolitan stance towards human rights and global 
justice.
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of the world and make a judgement as to which of them 
is worthy of our affection. If we have such a feeling, we 
simply find ourselves with it. Love is not a feeling that is 
rationally based. In a romantic context, we do not choose 
whom we might love, but find ourselves falling into love 
with them. If love were based on a rational appraisal of 
the beloved, we would be apt to change our affections if 
we met someone who fulfilled our criteria for romantic 
excellence more fully than the one we actually loved. 
But if we were inclined to do this we would not really be 
in love. If patriotism were a form of love it would also 
be irrational in this way. We would just find ourselves 
having such a feeling without any rational basis and 
without any judgement having been made by us about 
the worthiness of our country. 
Moreover, in all but the most unusual cases, the 
country that we have the feeling for is our country. For 
most people this will be the country of their birth, but for 
many it will be their adopted country or the country to 
which they have migrated. To explain the logical point 
that patriotism is love of our country, we can use the 
analogy of parental love. Parental love is love for the 
parent’s own child. It is not a love of children generally 
which happens to be applied to one’s own child. It is 
not love of childlike qualities which, because the parent 
happens to find them in their child, they then focus their 
love onto that child. It is the love of that particular child 
simply because that child is their child. In a similar way 
it is said that patriots love their country simply because 
it is their country. Using the parental love analogy shows 
that it is true by definition that the country a patriot loves 
is their own country. They might love or admire other 
countries for one reason or another but those loves are 
not cases of patriotism, just as loving another’s child is 
not a case of parental love. The explanation for parental 
love being necessarily directed upon the parent’s own 
child is clear. Most often it is based on blood ties and in 
other cases it is based on a bond that is created through 
adoption or a second marriage. 
If we endorse the theory that patriotism is a special 
case of love: namely, love of one’s country, and if we 
agree that there is no rational basis for such a love, we 
might nevertheless give an account of how patriots 
come to love their country. If it is not on the basis of 
reasons, then it will be a causal and psychological matter. 
It seems to be a psychological fact about most people 
that, in the course of their upbringing, they come to love 
their countries. Most basically, this will be because their 
own country is the country that they are most familiar 
with. If their country is the country of their birth, their 
country will also typically be the place where their most 
formative and valuable experiences have taken place. 
It will be the country whose history they have studied 
in school and celebrated in public events and holidays. 
At school they will have taken part in rituals such as 
saluting the flag. It will be the country whose citizens’ 
achievements have been most celebrated in their news 
media. The traditional values that they have acquired 
will be linked to the traditions of that country. Much of 
their experiences of art and entertainment will have come 
to them with a significance that speaks to them of their 
country. In some countries they will have heard stories 
about ancient links between the people and the land; 
between the race and its ties to the very soil upon which 
the country is based. In other countries they will have 
heard stories about settlers carving a new and civilised 
life out of the wilderness, or about the battles that were 
necessary to establish the nation in the face of opposition 
from invaders or internal threats. 
For migrants, on the other hand, there will be stories 
of families saved from economic hardship, political 
oppression or religious persecution, and of how the 
new country has been a source of refuge or opportunity. 
Migrants tend to enjoy split feelings about their 
countries. Many continue to feel links to, and take an 
interest in, the country of their birth, while also finding 
themselves with positive feelings towards the country 
in which they have settled. When they return to the 
country of their birth, whether to visit friends or enjoy a 
holiday, they often feel a special connection to their old 
country despite many years of separation. They might 
feel themselves torn when the football team of the old 
country meets the football team of the new. Whom will 
they barrack for? One British politician is reported to 
have said that it should be part of an English citizenship 
test that migrants barrack for England in such cases (Sen 
2006, 153). The crucial point here is that we are talking 
about feelings and affections which cannot be artificially 
produced by rational decisions or certified by loyalty 
tests. They are a product of an upbringing which is 
inevitably imbedded in a specific country.
As plausible as the social psychology account 
sketched here might be, I do wonder whether the picture 
of patriotism as love of one’s country that it gives us is 
accurate. Is patriotism to be understood as an irrational 
and socially caused affection for one’s country? Are 
the analogies with romantic love and parental love 
appropriate? One of the ethical implications of such 
analogies is that such a love should withstand negative 
judgements about the beloved. The love of a spouse 
should survive most if not all misdemeanours that the 
spouse might commit or blemishes in beauty or character 
that the spouse might suffer from. Parents should not 
reject their children when they fail to fulfil expectations 
or even turn to crime, but must continue to support 
them out of their love for them. If love of country is like 
this, does it follow that patriots must continue to love 
and support their countries even if their governments 
abuse human rights or engage in unjustified wars? Is 
there no point at which a rational appraisal of one’s 
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country’s moral and political status should counter the 
positive feelings that upbringing will have produced? If 
rationality plays no part in one’s love of country, then 
it would seem not. If patriotism is a special affection 
for one’s country, I doubt that we should call it “love” 
understood on analogy with such irrational forms as 
romantic or parental love. 
Identification
Let us consider what is meant by the second clause 
above: “a sense of personal identification with the 
country”. “Identification” is an important concept in this 
context. It refers to how persons understand themselves 
and what self-images they have. It refers to what persons 
will find important and to what they will give priority. 
It refers to the norms they internalise and how strongly 
they feel themselves bound by them. If persons identify 
themselves as Catholic, to use an example not directly 
linked to patriotism, they will see themselves as living 
a life dedicated to achieving salvation and union with 
God in heaven through participation in the sacramental 
life and theological beliefs of the Catholic Church. They 
will give priority to the rituals, doctrines and practices 
of the Church and think of themselves as Catholics to 
the extent that they fulfil those requirements. If they 
are in situations of ethical conflict, they will follow 
the guidelines of Catholic moral theology and will feel 
themselves to be sinners if they should fail to follow 
those norms. Their identification with their faith will lead 
them to hold very strongly to their moral convictions. 
Presented with an idea or a temptation that is contrary 
to the norms of their faith, they will reject it, not only 
as a violation of those convictions but also as an affront 
to who they are. They will also take part in public 
demonstrations of their religious commitment, whether it 
be through processions in the city streets or participation 
in pilgrimages to places sacred to the faith. Moreover, 
they will relate themselves to the central stories of their 
religion, seeking to live a life that imitates that of Jesus 
in relevant respects.
How would what we have learnt about what it is 
to identify oneself with a group in the case of religion 
apply to patriotism? What would “a sense of personal 
identification with a country” amount to? What does it 
mean to understand oneself, or announce oneself to the 
world, as an Australian? It would seem to imply that 
one relates oneself to the story of Australia and that one 
would want to participate in the rituals that mark one 
as an Australian. The history of a country is an ongoing 
saga with a vast cast of participants. But there are some 
people who are participants and others who are not. 
In calling oneself an Australian one is saying that one 
is a participant in that story and not the story of some 
other country. In this way one can take pride in the 
achievements recounted in that story, feel shame at the 
wrongs that have been done in it, and be committed to 
the progressive continuation of that story into the future 
and to playing a positive role in it. One associates oneself 
with other Australians, whether it be sports heroes, stars 
of entertainment, successful business entrepreneurs, or 
soldiers serving in other parts of the world. 
Whereas the theory that patriotism is love of one’s 
country would say that the processes of psychological 
formation, including engagement with national rituals 
and memorials, create affection for one’s country, I 
would say that what they produce is identification 
with one’s country. If the story of one’s country is 
predominantly a positive one, this identification will tend 
to produce in the patriot a feeling of pride. The processes 
through which a person comes to identify with his or her 
country produce, not love for, but pride in, one’s country. 
One can feel pride in one’s country to the extent that one 
identifies with it and with its achievements. Of course, 
there is a negative side to this. The story of Australia also 
includes shameful episodes – especially in relation to 
the dispossession of the aboriginal inhabitants and their 
subsequent treatment. While the ideological apparatus 
which seeks to create positive feelings for one’s country 
will stress the positive achievements, the negative 
episodes must also be dealt with. 
Our identity is a framework from within which we 
see the rest of the world. I think about the world and 
my obligations within it as an Australian, as a male, 
as someone well-to-do, as an atheist, as a member 
of a family, as white, as ‘Western’ and so on. The 
consequence of this is that when I have to decide whether 
to extend hospitality to others, the fact that one of the 
possible objects of my moral attention is an Australian, 
for example, is not so much a factor to be weighed up 
along with other factors such as the urgency of their 
need. Rather, it has the effect of drawing my attention to 
that person in a way that it is not drawn to another. This 
is why in news reports, when seventy people are killed 
in some disaster, we have our attention drawn to the fact 
(or drawn by the fact) that one of them was Australian. 
This is clearly not a matter of justice, which ought to be 
impartial. But it is a matter of human psychology which 
structures and expresses our identity in these and other 
ways.
If pride is a predominant expression of national 
identification in a self-confident country such as 
Australia, identification can take other forms in countries 
or communities that have been oppressed or humiliated 
in the course of their histories. Recent commentary 
on the causes of Islamisist terrorism, and on religious 
fundamentalism more generally, has described the victim 
mentality that often grows out of stories of national 
defeat or religious persecution. To identify with a 
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defeated people is often to court resentment and anger 
and to feel that only violence can restore the pride of 
one’s people (Armstrong 2000; Ali 2007, ch. 7).
Interpreting love of one’s country in terms of pride 
and identification helps to explain the very close link 
between patriotism and militarism. As a sociological 
fact there seems no doubt that there are very strong 
and frequent links between the two. Soldiers march 
at almost all of the rituals and celebrations that forge 
the identification of Australians with their country. 
Australian soldiers posted abroad are said to be serving 
their country even in cases where the foreign policies 
being pursued are ultimately those of the USA or when 
they are serving as part of a UN mandate. The bodies of 
war casualties and even of those who died by accident 
or friendly fire in foreign campaigns are brought home 
in coffins draped in the national flag. To be a soldier and 
to face danger in uniform is seen as the quintessential 
example of patriotism. The stories that constitute the 
historical lore of a nation will most often be stories of 
battles fought and won in order to establish and defend 
the national borders. These stories invite contemporary 
compatriots to identify themselves with the brave 
soldiers whose past exploits have forged the nation and 
its national character. Soldiers put their lives at risk, 
and those of us who sit comfortably at home readily 
identify with them in order to swell our pride. The 
sacrifices made by soldiers also highlight the fourth of 
Nathanson’s explications of what love of country might 
mean: namely, “Willingness to sacrifice to promote the 
country’s good”. Soldiers are seen as being willing to 
make the ultimate sacrifice, and many do. Whether they 
do so explicitly or self-consciously for the sake of their 
countries or whether their soldiering was just a way to 
escape unemployment or meaninglessness is immaterial. 
The rhetoric of patriotism will ensure that their deaths or 
wounds are interpreted as gifts to the nation with which 
their compatriots can identify. 
Concern
The third explication of what love of country might 
mean was, “special concern for the well-being of the 
country”. This might be thought to extend to a special 
concern for one’s compatriots. But, very often, “the well-
being of the country” is understood in economic terms. 
When Australians are urged to buy Australian products, 
for example, the prosperity is envisaged as benefiting the 
whole national community. It might begin by being the 
prosperity and profitability of the Australian companies 
whose goods are being favoured, but through secure 
employment and contributions to an equitable system of 
social welfare through taxation, this prosperity should 
flow through to the whole country. 
Such examples raise the question of what might 
be meant by “the national interest”. It would seem to 
include national prosperity based on successful private 
enterprise, along with protection of the borders and the 
state’s territorial integrity. National security is often said 
to be central to the national interest, but this frequently 
extends from protecting the nation’s territory and 
commercial resources at home to enhancing economic 
opportunities and securing natural resources abroad, 
whether by diplomatic or by military means. But the 
more important question is whether the objects of these 
interests correspond to what is loved when we speak 
of “love of country”. By and large the national interest 
corresponds to the interest of the nation-state. Given 
that the nation-state is a legally defined jurisdiction over 
which a government holds responsibility and within 
which commercial enterprises and individuals engage in 
their activities and pay taxes, there can be no doubt that 
there is a close link between every individual’s pursuit 
of sustenance and prosperity and the success of the 
national economy and of the government in protecting 
it. However, is this what we love when we love our 
countries? Is this what we take pride in when we identify 
with our countries? Is this what we are concerned for 
when we display a “special concern for the well-being 
of our country”? There may be some instances where 
we take pride in the achievements of our country’s 
entrepreneurs just as we do of our country’s sporting 
champions, but this will be because they are conspicuous 
high achievers with whom we can identify rather 
than because they have contributed to the country’s 
prosperity. Indeed, we admire them even if the profits 
they have generated go off shore. It is enough that they 
are our compatriots and that they are successful. Our 
pride and identification is based on their being successful 
compatriots rather than upon the benefits they may 
have given our nation-state. It seems, then, that love of 
country is not always coextensive with a special concern 
for the national interest.
Country
Let us return to the phrase “love of one’s country”. I 
have suggested that “love” should not be understood 
on analogy with romantic or parental love, but that 
it is better understood as a psychological form of 
identification, which ideally leads to pride in one’s 
country and concern for its well-being. But what do 
we understand by “country”? Do we mean the nation-
state of which one is a citizen, in whose political and 
commercial life we participate, and whose laws structure 
our lives? The social psychology account given above 
seems to suggest a different answer. This suggests 
that our bonds of loyalty are forged with our historical 
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people, its language, culture, and traditions. We may 
love the ethnicity which has shaped us and our outlook 
on the world. We may feel an attachment to the land on 
which we are born and whose very physical features 
have engrained themselves upon our hearts. We may 
relate to the religion of our forefathers or to the music 
and iconography we experienced as children. None of 
this may bear any direct relationship to the national 
citizenship with which we find ourselves. National 
borders are notoriously arbitrary. Borders often split 
peoples who share traditions and languages into different 
states, not only in countries that were once colonies 
of European powers, but even in countries with long 
histories of autonomy and political independence. 
Consider the Belgians, the Kurds, the Basques or the 
Tibetans. The most egregious examples are in Africa 
where hardly any borders correspond to the homeland 
of a people united by cultural traditions and ethnic 
identities. So what is the object of patriotism? Is it one’s 
country defined as the nation-state of which one is a 
citizen, or is it the ethnic, religious, or cultural group 
with which one identifies (Parekh 2003)? 
According to Anthony Giddens,
The nation-state, which exists in a complex of 
other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms 
of governance maintaining an administrative 
monopoly over a territory with demarcated 
boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by 
law and direct control of the means of internal and 
external violence (Giddens 1985, 121).
The notion of one’s country could refer to either 
this purely administrative notion of the nation-state, 
or to one’s community bound together by history, 
ethnicity, language, or a common social project. Many 
states contain a number of such communities (and 
sometimes not as wholes). It seems, then, that the 
notion of “country” as the object of one’s affection or 
identification is ambiguous. It follows that the notion 
of patriotism is ambiguous. It can mean identification 
with one’s traditional, ethnic, religious or national 
community, or it can mean one’s loyalty to the bordered 
political community or “polity” of which one is a citizen. 
Nathanson’s use of the term “country” obscures this 
ambiguity and the true nature of the object of one’s 
loyalty or allegiance which he describes as “love of 
country”. But insofar as he places stress on emotions 
such as affection, it seems to me that the proper object 
of the patriotism he describes is the cultural community 
with which one identifies rather than the nation-state of 
which one is a citizen.
One should not adopt an inflated conception of one’s 
national-state or of one’s nationality. One’s nationality is 
nothing more than one’s membership of the nation-state 
of which one is a citizen. It is simply what is indicated on 
one’s passport. If it is morally valuable it is for the same 
reasons that one’s citizenship is morally valuable. One’s 
nationality understood as citizenship shapes one’s moral 
commitments as a matter of pragmatic convenience and 
reciprocal justice. All that is needed in even the most 
multicultural of societies is that all the individuals and 
communities that comprise it respect the rule of law, 
contribute to the common good by paying taxes, and 
participate in its political processes in appropriate ways. 
This is what is meant by a “polity”. One’s nationality 
is one’s membership of a political community to which 
one has moral obligations as a citizen. Any deeper form 
of loyalty such as “love of country” is an optional extra. 
It seems either artificial or ideological to speak of a 
common project of seeking a good life (Taylor 1996, 
119-21) or of an “imagined community” (Appiah 1996, 
27). The polity of which one is a member is a political 
reality that has legal and pragmatic effects, while one’s 
community is the object of one’s affections and the 
source of one’s identity. 
Nationalism
The idea of a nation as an “imagined community” 
united by a common national project, culture or ancestry 
contributes to the ideology of nationalism. Nationalism 
became prominent in Europe during the nineteenth 
century and was used by rulers of European states 
in order to foment hatred of other nation-states and 
to encourage people to enlist in armies which would 
then engage in military adventures against each other 
(Cobban 1969). As an ideology it served the interests 
of ruling classes in their colonial expansion and in their 
competition with other nations for wealth and glory. It 
also served their interests by redirecting social unrest and 
quests for social justice into hatred of foreign powers. 
This led to the emergence of the modern European idea 
of a nation as a territory and a population coextensive 
with administrative borders and legal jurisdictions 
reinforced with a mythology which spoke of the 
destiny of a people as defined by those borders. “Nation 
building” – at least in its nineteenth century European 
forms and also its post-colonial forms in the emerging 
world – involved the attempt to bind people to the 
nation-state by bonds that are more than just pragmatic or 
based on shared interests or reciprocal duties. Even in the 
absence of a unifying tradition, religion or ethnicity, what 
such processes seek to create is allegiance and loyalty to 
the nation which go beyond merely instrumental forms 
of membership. 
Accordingly, the psychological phenomenon of 
nationalism occurs when one’s identity-shaping 
community and one’s nation-state are felt to correspond. 
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For a nationalist, the connection that one has to one’s 
nation-state will not feel arbitrary or merely pragmatic. 
It will be felt as an inseparable part of one’s identity. It 
is an object of commitment. The nationalist transfers 
the bonds he feels with his ethnic, linguistic or religious 
community to the nation-state of which he is a citizen. 
Cosmopolitans would be highly suspicious of these kinds 
of allegiance or loyalty and would see them as forms of 
nationalism that ought to be avoided. Loyalty to one’s 
identity-forming community is a valid form of belonging, 
but nationalism is a dangerous ideology (Appiah 2005, 
ch. 6).
But why is it important to avoid nationalism? Is 
there anything morally questionable about feeling a 
high degree of identification with one’s nation-state? 
Would such a degree of identification lead to morally 
reprehensible forms of tribalism? To begin to explore this 
question let us return to Stephen Nathanson. Nathanson 
speaks of extreme forms of patriotism which involve:
1. A belief in the superiority of one’s country
2. A desire for dominance over other countries
3. An exclusive concern for one’s own country
4. No constraints on the pursuit of one’s country’s 
goals
5. Automatic support of one’s country’s military 
policies. (Nathanson 1993, 29)
I would suggest that this sketch accurately describes 
nationalism. If I am right in this, then nationalism 
would be distinguished from patriotism not only by 
having a different object: namely, the nation-state, but 
also by being a different kind of stance towards that 
object: namely, an irrational commitment bordering 
on fanaticism. I would suggest that, if love of country 
or identification with one’s country takes the form of 
nationalism as explicated above, it is not a morally 
valuable stance or one which should take priority over 
the outlook of cosmopolitanism. 
The five attitudes above that constitute extreme 
patriotism or nationalism are irrational. If everyone 
around the world believed that their own country was 
superior, most of them would have to be wrong since 
only one country can be superior. The desire that one’s 
country have dominance over others is the same desire 
for glory and status which have led rulers and kings 
into battle with each other for centuries. Whether such 
battles are fought in contemporary business board rooms 
or the cabinet rooms of governments, the logic of such 
competitiveness leads inexorably to war. In a world of 
finite and diminishing resources, competitiveness can 
only lead to struggles over access to such resources. 
Third, to be concerned for one’s own country at the 
expense of others or even to the exclusion of others is 
simply a case of selfishness writ large. Just as selfishness 
is morally vicious if it is pursued at the expense of 
others or through exploiting others, so national interest 
is ethically reprehensible if pursued at the expense of, 
or through the exploitation of, other peoples. It is also 
irrational in that it will lead to resentment and thence to 
international instability. Fourth, anyone who thinks that 
there are no constraints on the pursuit of one’s country’s 
goals is someone who would be prepared to break both 
civil and international law, and also any moral norms, 
in order to secure their country’s interest and power. 
Fifth, the link so often made between patriotism and 
militarism can often lead to automatic endorsement of a 
country’s military policies. No matter how unjustified a 
war might be, anyone who questions it will be deemed 
disloyal or a traitor. Any dissent will be deemed an insult 
to the sacrifices made by the soldiers brought back in 
body bags. Any consideration of the humanity or of 
the interests of “the enemy”, or the deaths and injuries 
suffered by their civilians and soldiers, will be deemed 
cowardly and treasonous. 
It should not be necessary to take much time to show 
that these attitudes are irrational and unethical. However, 
if one has conceived of nationalism as an extreme form 
of patriotism and of patriotism as love of one’s country, 
and hence as an emotion not subject to the scrutiny of 
reasonable reflection, then it is very difficult to say how 
this irrational form can be avoided. If nationalism is 
an extreme form of patriotism and if patriotism is an 
irrational emotion then how can reason and common 
sense be deployed in order to prevent this extreme being 
reached?
The Ethics of Patriotism
We now have a number of intersecting distinctions. We 
have Nathanson’s distinction between patriotism and 
extreme patriotism, along with my suggestion that this 
extreme patriotism should be thought of as nationalism. 
Nathanson clearly disapproves of extreme patriotism 
but not of what he calls “moderate patriotism”. Then we 
have my suggestion that patriotism is itself an ambiguous 
notion referring to both a form of pragmatic and legal 
citizenship of the nation-state of which one is a member, 
and to allegiance to the people with whom one identifies 
and whose traditions one feels oneself belonging to. I 
have already explicated this form of patriotism through 
the process of identity formation rather than through the 
analogy with irrational love. I must now ask what moral 
judgements should be made about such processes and to 
the attitudes they produce. 
In order to do this, let us use a different analogy. 
Imagine that you are a fan of a football club. Your 
parents supported the club before you were born and 
took you to its matches from an early age. You now 
 PoliticalPatriotism    StanvanHooft
take a keen interest in the club’s activities. You attend 
all the matches you can, even travelling long distances 
in order to do so. You dress in the team’s colours and 
give friendly greetings to strangers dressed in the same 
colours. You enjoy talking with other supporters about 
past premierships and heroic deeds performed by star 
players. At the matches you barrack loudly, abuse the 
umpires, argue with the supporters of the opposing team, 
sing the club anthem vigorously, regard any free kicks 
awarded against your team as unjust and any awarded 
against the opposing team as thoroughly deserved, and 
so on. When the team wins you are elated and when 
they lose you feel crushed. You have done nothing 
more than add your voice and enthusiasm to the large 
crowd of supporters but when your team wins, you bask 
in its glory. When it loses you feel despondent. When 
its players cheat you feel real shame and when they 
display the virtues of sportsmanship you feel pride. You 
are a law-abiding citizen so you don’t become drunk 
and disorderly during or after the game and you do not 
engage in any hooliganism or violence against opposing 
supporters or their property. Nevertheless, you are hearty 
and boisterous in support of your team. In discussions 
with others you will claim that yours is the best team, 
prevented from taking the premiership only because of 
bad luck or bad umpiring decisions. You give money 
to the team through club memberships and raffles. You 
give priority to going to the matches over most other 
social events, and you read the sporting pages of the 
press avidly every day for news of your team’s players. 
In short, you love your team, are irrationally committed 
to it, take great pride in it, and identify yourself with it. 
It is easy to see how this sketch offers a suitable analogy 
for patriotism and even for nationalism. All the features 
of those phenomena listed above are present. This 
allegiance came to you as part of your upbringing and 
is now part of your social and existential identity. You 
love your team and are prepared to make sacrifices for its 
well-being.
The way in which many people passionately follow 
their sports teams or sporting heroes tells us something 
about the human condition. Friedrich Nietzsche 
(1844-1900) has argued that all of life – and thus human 
life also – involves struggles for domination. He calls 
this “will-to-power”. Animals compete against one 
another not only for access to food and resources and 
thus for survival, but also for dominance in their groups 
and for access to mates. In the context of human life, 
this competitiveness is sublimated and transformed into 
a struggle for status, self-affirmation, self-differentiation 
and dominance over others. We all want to shine. We 
want to be unique. We avoid merely fitting in with the 
mass of people. We pursue activities that require high 
levels of ability and we often create formal competitions 
to decide who has acquired the greatest skill. Alongside 
sporting competitions, we have musical talent quests, 
beauty pageants, and business competition. We are 
restless to succeed and to be better at our chosen calling 
than anyone else. Of course, these inclinations are 
tempered somewhat by ethical rules and constraints of 
etiquette so that the achievements that flow from them 
are turned to the benefit of others, but, without these 
constraints, human life would be a cut-throat struggle 
of the kind that Hobbes had postulated. It is not always 
a matter of acquiring power over others. It is often a 
pursuit of recognition and of status. We want to be 
acknowledged and we want our achievements praised. 
But we do not only want this for our individual selves. 
We also want it for the groups we identify with. We 
want our people or our club to be acknowledged and 
recognised. Moreover, we bask in the glory that our club 
or our people might achieve. Being a fan of a sporting 
club illustrated this well. We identify with the club. 
The basis of this identification might be historical – our 
parents and their parents also followed that club – or 
geographical – we live in the town of which that club 
is the representative – or arbitrary – we like the colour 
of their livery. But once we have made the commitment 
and identified ourselves as a fan of that club, then the 
successes of the club become our successes and its 
failures become our failures. Our enthusiasm for the 
club is an expression of will-to-power mediated by 
psychological identification with that club.
My first suggestion is that patriotism, both in its 
moderate and extreme, nationalist forms, should be 
understood as a form of will-to-power in the same way 
as being a fan of a football club can be.
But there is a crucial difference. However intense 
your enthusiasm for a football team or a sports hero and 
however total your commitment to them, you are always 
able to say to yourself that it is only a game. If you are 
a rational person, you will be aware that none of the 
excitement, ritual, legends, heroes, victories and losses of 
a football club is of ultimate importance. You might not 
ever say this to yourself and the rhetoric into which you 
have immersed yourself may seem to speak of ultimacy, 
but you would not be prepared to kill anyone to defend 
the honour or interests of your team. You would not 
refuse to attend you spouse’s funeral if it were held on 
the afternoon of a match – even if it were a Grand Final. 
Joking with friends over a few drinks you might swear 
that nothing is more important to you than your team’s 
fortunes, but you would secretly know that you were 
acting out a part. You would be able to laugh at yourself. 
You would enjoy your commitment as a kind of play 
acting or a charade. Taking it seriously and avowing its 
ultimacy is part of that game. You identify yourself as a 
team supporter and you would play out the role that this 
gives you, but you would be subliminally aware that it is 
a role. Your commitment would be ironic.
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Such irony is not appropriate in the context of love. 
You don’t love your spouse with the secret thought that 
it is only a game. You don’t love your child with an 
implicit laugh at the role you are playing as a parent.
My second suggestion is that patriotism should be 
understood through the analogy, not of romantic or 
parental love, but of being a football fan. If the irony and 
hidden detachment that marks a reasonable commitment 
to a football team could be applied to one’s commitment 
to one’s country or one’s people, then patriotism could 
be seen as an ethically harmless commitment and the 
excesses of nationalism could be avoided. Nationalism 
or extreme patriotism arises when the commitment to 
one’s country becomes absolute and inflexible so as 
to override any moral constraints and any norms of 
reasonableness. This suggests that a morally acceptable 
form of allegiance to country – whether in the form 
of the nation state or in the form of one’s people and 
its traditions – is a form that is attended by flexibility 
and an absence of absolutism: that is, by irony. Just as 
a rational person must judge that a football team has 
no ultimate importance, so one needs to consider how 
important the object of one’s patriotic allegiance should 
be. My love for my spouse has an object that is highly 
significant and demanding and any degree of irony 
would be inappropriate. I would say the same in relation 
to my child. But of my country we can certainly ask 
how important it is and what the degree and scale of our 
commitment should be. Insofar as nationalism or extreme 
patriotism is a form of commitment which smacks of 
fanaticism, any degree of irony will destroy it. And so it 
should. 
But does this mean that the milder form of patriotism 
that Nathanson has described and which he espouses 
can be endorsed by a cosmopolitan? While I think such 
patriotism is as harmless as barracking for a football 
team, I don’t think it should be given much ethical 
significance or normativity. In and of itself one’s country 
is of little importance. Both patriotism and nationalism 
become pernicious if the special focus upon one’s 
country that they espouse elevates that country into 
having an importance of its own and militates against the 
scope and urgency of one’s concern for human rights and 
social justice at a global scale. The ethical commitment 
of a cosmopolitan is to human rights and global justice. 
The cosmopolitan’s own country has a role to play in 
the pursuit of human rights and global justice both in its 
internal policies and in its foreign policies. Accordingly, 
the cosmopolitan pursues her global ethical concerns 
through the political processes of her own country and 
therefore has some commitment to those processes. 
Political Patriotism 
Accordingly, what we need is a political conception of 
patriotism. I define “political patriotism” as loyalty to 
the polis of which one is a member. I intend, with this 
phrase, to echo the notion of “political liberalism” used 
by John Rawls, through which he articulated the idea 
of a pragmatic approach to political engagement free of 
commitments to values and conceptions of the good life 
not shared by all (Rawls 1993). My concept is also akin 
to that of “constitutional patriotism” espoused by Jürgen 
Habermas, which expresses feelings of solidarity that 
grow out of democratic participation rather than out of 
commitments to romanticised notions of the nation or to 
ethnic, linguistic or religious communities (Habermas 
1996; Lacroix 2002). It was Socrates in the Crito who 
first articulated this form of social and political loyalty 
and respect for the rule of law. Offered the chance to 
escape from prison and his judicial execution, Socrates 
refuses on the ground that “the Laws” have been of 
service to him by establishing the society in which he 
was able to flourish, and have thereby earned his loyalty 
and commitment. To subvert the rule of law by escaping 
would be to undermine the political consensus upon 
which Athens has established its social order. Whereas 
other cities were ruled by power, force and fear, Athens 
was a polity that depended upon the cooperation of its 
members. This cooperation is an instance of political 
patriotism: a practical stance towards the political 
structures of which one is a part based upon the extent 
to which those structures protect human rights and 
produce social justice. In the modern European tradition 
this idea is best expressed by the notion of a social 
contract through which both the legitimacy of the 
state and the citizen’s obligation to respect the rule of 
law are established by an implicit acknowledgement 
of the contract-like practical commitment of both to 
social justice. Allegiance to the state is secured by 
the state’s adhering to its part of the implicit bargain 
when it protects citizens from foreign incursions 
or from domestic criminality and when it secures a 
just distribution of social goods. This allegiance to 
the state is expressed by a willingness to contribute 
to the common weal by paying taxes, serving in the 
military, contributing to the economy, and participating 
in political decision making. This form of patriotism 
may be most readily elicited in a modern, pluralist 
and liberal state, but it can also arise in other forms of 
political organisation in which rights are protected and 
the laws applied impartially. Such patriotism defines the 
political community as an object of one’s allegiance. 
The willingness to participate in the political process in 
accordance with civic duty is a form of that allegiance. 
However, the political community is seen, not as an 
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object of ultimate importance or blind loyalty, but as a 
means for securing the political goals of justice and the 
protection of human rights. This form of patriotism is 
not seduced by the romance of the nation or constrained 
by the sanctity of tradition. Nor does it imagine that the 
demands of human rights or of justice stop at the borders 
of the state of which one is a citizen. Political patriotism 
could even be seen as a practical and localised form of 
cosmopolitanism.
Nathanson’s argument against militaristic forms of 
patriotism provides an unintended hint of this idea. 
He argues that it is a mistake to admire as patriotic 
only soldiers who are prepared to, or actually have 
had to, give their lives for their country. We should be 
prepared to praise as patriotic anyone who sacrifices 
something to promote the country’s good: people like fire 
fighters, nurses and teachers. According to Nathanson, 
businessmen who pay their taxes, judges who administer 
the law with impartiality and politicians who seek the 
people’s good without fear or favour are all patriots 
in this sense. I would respond by arguing that the 
term “patriot” has now become too broad. What these 
ethically admirable people are doing is pursuing a range 
of values which are good in themselves. The national 
identity of these values or of the people who benefit 
from them is irrelevant. Safety from fire, social justice, 
impartiality in the rule of law, education and health care 
are all values that it is good to pursue. But they are not 
values that depend on any identification with a nation or 
a country. It is admirable to pursue them and we should 
praise those that do so, but it adds nothing to expressions 
of that admiration to call those that one admires in such 
contexts patriotic. It is commitment to people, to justice 
and to human rights which motivates such virtue. One’s 
country has nothing to do with it.
And yet it does at a political level. If we interpret 
“one’s country” as the nation-state of which one is 
a citizen or legal resident, then we can acknowledge 
the political system of this nation-state as the forum 
in which we can pursue the moral values of human 
rights and social justice. The nation-state has a role to 
play. The administrative concept of a state is a social 
and historical necessity (Glazer 1996). The territorial 
boundaries of legal jurisdictions need to be defined. The 
range and scope of government responsibilities need to 
have borders. And the capacity of political institutions 
and participants to effect change is limited and defined 
by such jurisdictions and boundaries. If the government 
of a state or its citizens wanted to effect a change in 
another state for humanitarian reasons, they would not 
have the jurisdiction to do so and would have to act on a 
government-to-government basis or through international 
political institutions such as the UN. The issue of 
humanitarian intervention is a vexed one, but my point 
for the moment is that any actions taken in the pursuit of 
social justice or for the protection of human rights around 
the world need to be taken through governmental and 
political institutions in one’s own state and in the other 
relevant state. Even cosmopolitans have to acknowledge 
the practical importance of the state in the pursuit of both 
cosmopolitan and national goals. It is this necessity that 
grounds that form of patriotism I have called “political 
patriotism”. 
Igor Primoratz has argued that patriotism may 
consist in pride in one’s nation-state based on the moral 
accomplishments of that state rather than upon its 
successes in international competition, whether in the 
fields of commerce or war. Primoratz calls this “ethical 
patriotism” and describes it as a concern for the ethical 
status of one’s country and of its moral standing in the 
world community (Primoratz 2008). This position does 
not pursue the political, economic and cultural advantage 
of one’s country – either exclusively as in extreme 
patriotism or critically as in moderate patriotism, but its 
moral interests. It asks a country to take a cosmopolitan 
stance in its foreign policies. What one’s commitment 
is to when one is an ethical patriot in this sense, is the 
value of global justice and the importance of human 
rights both within one’s own nation-state and beyond 
it. One’s nation-state is merely a vehicle for pursuing 
those values. At best the pride one might feel in one’s 
citizenship of an ethical state will serve to motivate the 
political engagement which ensures that one’s state acts 
as a good global citizen. But the state is not, of itself, an 
appropriate object of nationalist or patriotic fervour.
Self-Determination
There is one qualification that I need to make to my 
rejection of nationalism as extreme patriotism of the 
form expressed in such slogans as “my country, right or 
wrong!” and of even moderate patriotism understood 
as “love of country”. Nationalism can have politically 
progressive effects as well as bellicose and competitive 
effects. As Immanuel Wallerstein has argued, solidarity 
can be a weapon of the weak against the strong. Only 
the strong can afford to be cosmopolitans (Wallerstein 
1996). When a people united by language, culture or 
tradition is subjugated or colonised by a more powerful 
people or state, its sense of itself as a people and the 
way in which individuals identify themselves with their 
language, culture or tradition can become a powerful 
political force. Struggles for national liberation or for 
self-determination on the part of peoples are seen by 
many commentators as legitimate and are frequently 
acknowledged by international law. The UN affirms 
the right of peoples to self-determination although it 
acknowledges that it is neither practicable nor desirable 
for all peoples united by language, culture or tradition to 
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become sovereign states. Self-determination needs to be 
given form as political autonomy within federated states 
or other political structures acceptable to all concerned. 
Whatever the difficulties that arise from struggles for 
self-determination, my point is that they are motivated 
by a form of nationalism which is politically legitimate. 
Such forms of nationalism are political expressions of 
linguistic, religious or cultural forms of identity and, 
as such, are deeply motivational. They are yet another 
form of Nathanson’s “love of country”. While I would 
consider that a dose of irony is morally required for 
even these kinds of nationalists, I would consider them 
legitimate bases for political engagement and struggles 
for human rights and social justice in those cases where 
a people is unfairly subjugated or oppressed. It is at 
such points as these that identification with one’s people 
combines with political patriotism to produce a valid 
form of nationalism.
Conclusion
Patriotism can be an ethically appropriate identification 
with one’s political community. It is appropriate to the 
extent that one’s political community honours human 
rights and pursues justice in all parts of the world. In 
this way it does not put the national interest or dreams 
of national glory ahead of cosmopolitan values, and it 
does not imagine that one’s own nation, ethnic identity or 
cultural traditions are of paramount importance.Political 
patriotism is leavened with a touch of irony.
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